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OPTIONS FOR OWNERS AND OUTLAWS
LEE ANNE FENNELL*
Property rights delegate control to owners and other possessors1
within a compass that is specified spatially, temporally, and func-
tionally.2 Within these confines, owners have choices. They can
decide where and how to engage in a particular use, and which of
the permissible uses to pursue at a given time. Within legal limits,
they may hold onto or dispose of the property interest, or a portion
of it. Drawing on analogies from finance, scholars have character-
ized these choices (and many others) as “real options.”3 An option
gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to do a particular
thing, such as to sell or buy an entitlement at a given price.4 Real
options in land are not explicit—no financial instrument changes
hands—but rather are embedded in the structure of the entitlement
* Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar,
University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Yun-chien Chang, Ruoying Chen, Donald
Clarke, Christopher Fennell, Shitong Qiao, and participants in the June 2011 Conference on
Property Rights and China’s Development and Transformation, and in the 8th Annual Brigham-
Kanner Property Rights Conference for helpful comments and questions. Aaron Benson and Lea
Madry provided excellent research assistance, and the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty
Fund provided financial support. All errors are mine.
1. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
REV. 965, 974–85 (2004) (explaining how exclusion-based property rules delegate decisions
about uses to owners). In this essay, I will use the term “owner” very broadly as a shorthand
term for legally recognized possessory rights in real property, regardless of the labels they are
given or the form that they take.
2. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F. 3d 764, 774
(9th Cir. 2000) (“the dimensions of a property interest may include a physical dimension
(which describes the size and shape of the property in question), a functional dimension
(which describes the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the property in question),
and a temporal dimension (which describes the duration of the property interest)”), quoted in
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 318 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Laura Quigg, Optimal Land Development, in REAL OPTIONS IN CAPITAL
INVESTMENT: MODELS, STRATEGIES, AND APPLICATIONS 265 (Lenos Trigeorgis ed., 1995); LENOS
TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
9–14 (1996). Options embedded in real estate ownership represent only one application of real
options analysis.
4. A call option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase the en-
titlement at the strike price, while a put option gives its holder the right, but not the obli-
gation, to sell the entitlement at the strike price. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART
C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 503–05 (10th ed. 2011).
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itself.5 I will refer to them here as “embedded real property options”
(“ERPOs”) to distinguish them from formal options to buy and sell
interests in land, which parties may also transact over.
ERPOs have four notable characteristics. First, they do not typical-
ly feature fixed exercise prices or well-defined exercise periods. For
example, an owner of a fee simple absolute may hold an option to de-
velop the land for an indefinite period of time, but the price of exercis-
ing that option will fluctuate with the prices of inputs to development.
Second, and closely related, ERPOs held by landowners and other
possessors are subject to a set of trumping options held by the gov-
ernment and by other parties. For example, zoning laws may change
in ways that eliminate particular options, or a neighbor may move
next door and engage in a use that falls short of an actionable nui-
sance but that nonetheless precludes certain sensitive land uses.
Third, the value of the option is tightly (if implicitly) tied to the
underlying rules about who shall receive gains and losses associated
with activity on the land. For example, a leaseholder may have the
option to modify her premises by, say, installing built-in bookcases,
but will not typically be entitled to any of the gains that come from
those changes.
Finally, possessors are often in a position to exercise what I will
here term “outlawed options”—the option to do something with the
land that falls outside of the legally prescribed compass. To exercise
an outlawed option, the actor pays the (implicit) strike price repre-
senting the expected repercussions from violating a prohibition or
otherwise moving outside of the law’s protection.
ERPOs interact with law and policy and with the options held by
other parties to dynamically construct the on-the-ground experience
of property. In this essay, I explore these interactions in three steps.
First, I lay out the basics of ERPOs and show how they operate in
the shadow of trumping options held by the government and other
parties. Second, I examine the special case of “outlawed options,”
using “small title” residential holdings in urbanizing areas of China
5. Legal scholars have explored embedded options in a variety of doctrinal areas. See,
e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005); Robert E.
Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract
Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428 (2004); George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite
Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1686 n.114 (2006).
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as a motivating example. Finally, I consider what an option-centered
view means for property as an instrument of social policy. Because
an option-based approach can translate diverse mixes of legal enti-
tlements and extralegal moves into a common currency, it offers a use-
ful vehicle for drawing connections and lessons across legal regimes.
I. LEGAL OPTIONS FOR OWNERS
Owners and other entitlement holders derive value from a variety
of real options embedded in their property interests. The value of
these embedded real property options (“ERPOs”) depends on the
extent of the entitlement in time, space, and function, the operative
rules about who shall bear gains and losses, and the interaction of
these ERPOs with trumping governmental options and with the
ERPOs of other entitlement holders. The sections below examine a
non-exhaustive set of ERPOs often associated with ownership: the
option to develop, to remain on, and to dispose of the property.6 The
next Part will take up outlawed options.
A. The Option to Develop
The ownership of vacant land embeds an option to develop it, as
the real options literature has recognized.7 To take a simple example,
an owner of an empty parcel can decide whether to develop the par-
cel immediately, or to wait and develop it later. If developing now
for use A destroys or makes prohibitively expensive any possibility
of developing the property for use B, then there is an option value
associated with leaving the land undeveloped: the owner retains the
right to develop for either use A or use B at their respective prices.
In this context, the development prices for the uses are not preset as
they are in the case of financial options; instead, these development
6. Compare TRIGEORGIS, supra note 3, at 9–14 (detailing real options associated with an
oil drilling lease).
7. A foundational work is Sheridan Titman, Urban Land Prices Under Uncertainty, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 505 (1985). See also Joseph T.L. Ooi, C.F. Sirmans, & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, The
Option Value of Vacant Land, Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
Urban and Regional Analysis Group, Working Paper No. 06-05 (March 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=952556 (presenting an empirical analysis in the context of Singapore’s
residential land market and discussing earlier work).
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options are “floating options” whose exercise or strike price is set by
the market conditions prevailing at the time the option is exercised.8
The option to develop is not unlimited. Property rights are crea-
tures of a political process. As such, they embody already-enacted
constraints and are subject to further change through governmental
action. Thus, any real options an owner or possessor of land holds
are themselves subject to a trumping set of governmental options.9
While these trumping options vary among jurisdictions, they gener-
ally include the right, but not the obligation, to take for public use
upon the provision of compensation.10 In addition, the government
retains the right, but not the obligation, to make many sorts of reg-
ulatory changes that diminish the value of property rights without
providing compensation.11 This latter set of options may extinguish
some of the owner’s options, including options to develop the prop-
erty at certain times, for certain uses, or along certain physical di-
mensions. To put it another way, the exercise period for the owner’s
option to develop can end without much warning.
Because of these conditions on the owner’s option set, the real
options held by owners might be regarded as “soft options” that exist
only at the government’s pleasure. However, owners who undertake
certain acts can vest their rights and thereby solidify the option to
continue along a planned development path.12 Moreover, once owners
8. See Eric Kades, Avoiding Takings “Accidents”: A Tort Perspective on Takings Law, 28
U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1255–56 (1994) (discussing “floating options”).
9. See Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Land Development Under the Threat of Taking, 69 S. ECON.
J. 290 (2002) (analyzing the impact on development of the threat of a governmental prohi-
bition or restriction on development).
10. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The term “public use” has been equated
with “public purpose.” See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
Compare Article 13 of the 2004 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, translation
of The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.npc.gov.cn
/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm (providing that “[t]he State may,
in the public interest and in accordance with law,” take “private property for its use and
make compensation”).
11. The line between compensable takings and non-compensable regulatory actions is
notoriously unclear and governed by a mix of per se rules and balancing factors. I will not
attempt to detail this complex area of law here, but these famous words of Justice Holmes
suggest the difficulty of the line-drawing challenge: “The general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
12. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1238–40 (2009) (discussing the vested rights doctrine).
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actually develop property for a given use, the government is sig-
nificantly constrained both as a matter of law and politics from
making uncompensated inroads into the stream of benefits secured
by that option exercise.13 In this respect, some of the government’s
options (those to engage in uncompensated changes in use rights)
are themselves “soft options” that can be eliminated through the
prior exercise of options by owners. But the government’s right to
engage in compensated takings remains a “hard option” that trumps
all others, as long as doctrinal requirements as to compensation and
the purpose of the taking are met.
To see the interaction of these options, consider the following
example. Suppose an owner has a parcel of land that can be used for
either of two economically viable uses: use A, the development of a
single family home on a large lot; or use B, the development of a 30-
family dwelling unit on that same lot. On any plausible projection,
developing the property for a single-family use will require changes
to the land and investments in durable structures significant enough
to rule out redeveloping for the 30-family dwelling anytime within
the next 10 years, and, likewise, developing for the 30-family dwell-
ing will rule out for at least a decade redeveloping for single-family
use. At Time 1, the owner is not sure which alternative will turn
out to be more profitable. There is a 50% chance that use A (single-
family) will be twice as profitable as use B (30-family), and a 50%
chance that use B (30-family) will be four times as profitable as use
A (single-family).
If the owner were forced to make a decision now, the expected
value calculation is clear; use B dominates. But suppose the owner
is not forced to make a decision now and can instead delay the de-
cision by one year (to Time 2), when population trends will make
clear which of the two uses would be more profitable. Waiting comes
with an opportunity cost because it delays any stream of benefits
from either of the two uses. This opportunity cost can be understood
as part of the price of holding real options open on use A and use B
for the upcoming year. It is only part of the option price, however;
the expected losses from the governmental options outstanding on
the property represent another cost of waiting. Under current U.S.
13. But see id. at 1242–61 (questioning the basis of this well-accepted legal principle and
concluding that “current constitutional doctrine does not compel categorical protection for
existing uses”).
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law, a governmental entity might be able to eliminate either the
owner’s option to develop for use A or her option to develop for use
B without triggering a compensation requirement—although elim-
inating both would almost certainly amount to a taking if use A and
use B together represent the entire universe of economically viable
uses for the land.14
Finally, either before or after any development activity is under-
taken, the government could engage in a compensated taking. After
the land has been developed, however, the cost to the government
of exercising this option will be higher than before, to the extent
that compensation applies to the costs of the improvements on the
land as well as the land itself.15 Thus, one effect of developing more
quickly is to raise the government’s exercise price for a compensated
taking and hence render it less likely.16 Whether or not this will
actually have a pro-development effect depends on many factors,
such as whether compensation is inadequate, adequate, or excessive,
and how sensitive the government’s demand for property is to com-
pensation requirements.17
B. The Option to Remain (or Not)
The fact that property interests extend forward in time—
indefinitely, in the case of the fee simple—offers owners the option
to stay on the land long enough to collect on investments they have
14. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. The potential moral hazard associated with compensation for improvements has
been noted. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings:
An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 619 (1984).
16. See THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN: PRIVATE
PROPERTY, PUBLIC USE 90–96 (2011) (noting that landowners may be able to influence the
probability of a taking through their investment decisions, and examining the resulting
incentives under different compensation rules and assumptions about government).
17. For example, undercompensation might be expected to reduce development, because
a landowner would fear multiplying the base to which the undercompensation would apply.
But enough development might ward off a price-sensitive but undercompensating condemning
authority. See id.; see also Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under
Eminent Domain, 147 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 354 (1991) (modeling the incentives for
landowners to overinvest or underinvest where their investment decisions can influence the
probability of a taking). The extent to which governmental entities respond to monetary incen-
tives is unclear. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics,
and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
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made.18 An important subspecies of this option is the residential
property occupant’s right to remain in place.19 A residential ERPO
holds special significance because of the often idiosyncratic value
placed on possession, and the potential for periods of possession to
add value in nonlinear ways.20 Residents often make site-specific
investments in the community and find themselves unable to repli-
cate certain aspects of the residential experience, such as thick com-
munity ties, in a new location. Yet the option to remain holds value
precisely because future payoffs are presently unknown; one is un-
der no obligation to stay if the community disappoints, or if better
opportunities become available elsewhere.
As with the option to develop, the occupant’s option to remain is a
“soft option” that may be trumped in any number of ways, including
through condemnation, foreclosure, or, in the case of rental property,
the landlord’s decision to withdraw the unit from the market. The
trumping options held by governmental entities, mortgagees, and
landlords are not costless to exercise, however, and the law can do
a variety of things to influence their strike prices.21
Exercising one’s residential possessory option also generally
requires making monetary payments at regular intervals—rent,
mortgage, or property taxes. These amounts can fluctuate. In-kind ex-
penditures may also be required, such as keeping the property up to
code and monitoring for interlopers.22 The larger these expenditures
18. As such, we might think of owners as possessing a kind of rolling option, in which
exercising the option to remain in any given period may (depending on the tenure form at
issue) generate an option to remain in a subsequent period.
19. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350,
359–63, 368–70 (1986); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law
Protections for Security of Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV.
817, 820–29 (2008).
20. But see Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of
Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1109–19 (2009) (noting the relative lack of empirical evidence
to support the common assumption that displacement from the home inflicts a particularly
grievous loss on households).
21. For example, mortgagees must go through specified foreclosure procedures, while
landlords must comply with applicable legal provisions when converting property from rental
units to condominiums.
22. Where formal title is unavailable, squatters may devote significant resources to guard-
ing the property. See Erica Field, Property Rights, Community Public Goods, and Household
Time Allocation in Urban Squatter Communities: Evidence from Peru, 45 WM & MARY L. REV.
837, 858 (2004); see also infra note 75 and accompanying text. Even with secure property
rights, land may be lost to adverse possession if interlopers are allowed to enjoy a lengthy
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become relative to the stream of expected benefits generated by
staying, the less likely it is that one’s option will be “in the money”
or worth exercising. Implicit limits on the applicable strike price for
exercising the possessory option are embedded in many contractual
and institutional arrangements, from fixed-rate 30-year mortgages
to rent control to property tax caps. But long-lasting possessory op-
tions with low strike prices and limited trumping options do not
come cheap. Mandating strong residential ERPOs may thus curtail
households’ access to housing in the first place.23
The option to stay implies the option to leave, yet doing so is not
always costless. Households with mortgages are often said to hold
embedded put options that give them the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to force a sale of the property back to the mortgagee at the
price of the outstanding loan balance, even when the property is cur-
rently worth far less.24 In some states, this option is the explicit prod-
uct of laws that forbid lenders to take recourse against a defaulting
mortgagor’s other assets, while in others it exists in de facto form
whenever borrowers have too few other assets to be worth pursuing
for the shortfall.25 The exercise of such options has raised serious
concerns in the present U.S. housing market, given the significant
proportion of homes that are worth less than their outstanding loan
balances.26 In one sense, the defaulting borrowers are simply exer-
cising a bargained-for option. But the potential for such exercises to
generate externalities, especially if conducted on a broad scale,
period of uninterrupted occupancy—although either regular possession or monitoring by the
owner can avoid this result. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1130 (1985).
23. This charge is frequently leveled at rent control and other regulations designed to
protect tenants. Although the empirical picture is often complex, the core intuition is not:
making landlording significantly less profitable could be expected to result in less of it, other
things being equal.
24. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2009).
25. See id. at 30.
26. Nationwide, between a fifth and a quarter of homes with mortgages are “underwater,”
or worth less than what is owed on the mortgage, with significant regional variation. See
CoreLogic, Corelogic Reports Negative Equity Increase in Q4 2011 (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/researchtrends/asset_upload_file360_14435.pdf (reporting
a national figure of 22.8% for underwater residential mortgages at the end of the fourth quarter
of 2011; in five states the combined average negative equity rate is 44.3%, while the re-
maining states’ combined average is 15.3%).
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complicates the picture considerably—the lender is not the only one
who stands to lose.27
C. The Option to Dispose
As the preceding discussion of strategic default already illus-
trated, landowners may hold ERPOs to end their involvement with
the property and its improvements.28 Most ways of legally getting
rid of property require the cooperation of a buyer or other recipient
and hence are not options in the usual sense. However, in a legal
regime with free alienability, there is an option to offer the property
for sale—an act which can be accomplished unilaterally, and which,
like the option to develop, carries a calculable strike price and ex-
pected return under specified market conditions. Implicit in the right
to alienate the property is the option to hold onto the property as long
as desired before exercising that option, whether in expectation of
price appreciation or in the hope of receiving returns on a site-specific
investment. Of course, the option to sell at a time of one’s own choos-
ing may be trumped by involuntary transfers (as through eminent
domain) or curtailed by governmental limits on alienability.
Alienability limits can take many forms and can be used to achieve
a variety of ends.29 Of particular relevance to the discussion above
is the way in which alienability restrictions (including limits on the
ability to alienate security interests) can be used to advance the op-
tion to remain. A paternalistic rationale for restricting alienability
is to prevent ill-considered transfers that leave the transferor worse
off. Some alienability limits take the form of an enforced delay or
“cool off” period to keep individuals from making a rash judgment
27. See Luigi Zingales, The Menace of Strategic Default, CITY J. (Spring 2010), available at
http://city-journal.org/printable.php?id=6069. But see Brent T. White, Is Strategic Default a
Menace?, CITY J. FORUM, http://www.city-journal.org/2010/forum0427.html (April 27, 2010)
(responding to Zingales’s arguments).
28. Not all ways of cutting short one’s involvement with property are legally permitted,
even under conditions of free alienability. For a discussion of the common law’s disallowance
of abandonment of fee simple interests see Lior J. Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U.
PENN. L. REV. 355, 399–402 (2010).
29. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
931 (1985).
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that they will later regret.30 In some cases the limit may be a product
of presumed information asymmetries. Paternalistic rationales may
also fade into pure externality-based rationales when transactions
would threaten a society’s normative commitments. The character-
ization of rural land in China as a “social safety net” for peasant
households31 seems to draw on at least some of these considerations.
An even more interesting rationale for alienability limits relates
to self-selection.32 If one wishes to attract buyers who will use the
property themselves, there is perhaps no more direct way to do so
than to forbid resale. Even when resale is not forbidden outright,
restrictions on how, when, and by whom interests can be sliced and
reaggregated will have the effect of shaping the market in particular
ways, attracting certain market participants and repelling others.
II. OUTLAWED OPTIONS
Legal restrictions on property may be disregarded where the net
gain from doing so is great enough, given the expected sanctions.
This Part examines options to move outside of legal parameters.
A. Pricing Unapproved Alternatives
Occupiers of land are often in an excellent position to use prop-
erty in legally unapproved ways or to transact over it outside of le-
gally recognized “transaction structures.”33 In the context of housing,
30. See, e.g., Bruce Twomley, License Limitation in Alaska’s Commercial Fisheries 6 (2003),
available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/2203 (describing 60-day waiting period
for sales of certain Alaskan fishing permits “[t]o avoid intemperate sales”).
31. See, e.g., Feng Frederic Deng, Housing of Limited Property Rights: A Paradox Inside
and Outside Chinese Cities 7 (Working Paper 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1151101 (“with rural land forced to stay in peasants’ hands, it functions as a safety net or
last resort for those peasants who work in the city in case of economic downturn or job loss”);
Gregory M. Stein, Private and Public Construction in Modern China, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
5, 42 (2010) (noting concerns about dislocation associated with loss of agricultural land); see
also Ruoying Chen, Informal Sales of Rural Housing in China: Property, Privatization and
Local Public Finance 20, 36 (working paper 2010), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu
/files/file/Chen New- Informal Sales of Rural Residential Land.pdf.
32. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 29, at 960–61.
33. Cf. Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 289, 301–03 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (using the notion
of “transaction structures” to define criminal conduct).
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the potential for informal, extralegal, or just plain illegal arrange-
ments is relatively great. The ways in which people use residential
spaces are heterogeneous and hard to monitor, and privacy interests
may limit the extent to which intrusion into the specifics of living
arrangements will be pursued. Thus, the fact that certain choices
are not available through recognized legal channels does not neces-
sarily make them completely unavailable; it may instead merely
alter their prices.
The law and economics literature is replete with discussions of
certain kinds of sanctions as “liability rules” that permit entitle-
ments to change hands on the unilateral initiative of one party, upon
the payment of a fee.34 Liability rules are often explicitly described
as call options because they give one party the right but not the obli-
gation to do something upon paying what amounts to a strike price.35
While there is controversy surrounding this way of thinking about
legal violations,36 the fact remains that often what appear on the
surface to be prohibitions end up operating like prices. As informal
work-arounds shade into non-recognized or even legally prohibited
arrangements, the strike price of exercising a given option will in-
corporate the uncertainty and risk associated with moving outside
the law’s formal protection.
Questions arise not only with respect to formal legal sanctions,
but also as to whether particular interests will be protected against
exploitation by other private parties or against uncompensated ap-
propriation by the government. The government clearly has choices
in this regard, and can adjust the level of legal protection afforded
to informal or unapproved arrangements to suit its ends. For exam-
ple, it might leave informal settlers exposed to governmental appro-
priation, but protect them from private expropriation.37 Depending
34. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822,
852–54 (1993).
36. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335, 1370–71 (1986); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A
Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 858–61 (1997).
37. An interesting example of this approach is provided by the British Colonial Office’s
(“BCO’s”) licensing system for squatters on the Australian frontier during the nineteenth
century. See Lee J. Alston, Edwyna Harris, & Bernardo Mueller, Property Rights, Land
Settlement and Land Conflict on Frontiers: Evidence from Australia, Brazil and the US, in
250 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:239
on the stream of consumption benefits produced by the informal ar-
rangement and the costs and risks of the outside options available
to the residents, something less than full-blooded title may be enough
to spur transactions and investments in residential property.38 In
the balance of this Part, I will use the “small title”39 sales of rural
land to urban buyers in China as a springboard for thinking about
these issues.
B. The Case of Small Title
In China, all urban land is state owned; private parties occupy
it under long-term leases.40 The only legal method to transform
collectively owned rural land into urban land is through eminent
domain.41 Yet the expansion of urban areas and the demand for
urban housing make the prospect of simply turning land designated
as rural into urban residential developments very attractive. Doing
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 9, 15–16 (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). As the authors explain, “[u]nder the license system, squatters
paid £10 annually to occupy as much land as they pleased. Licenses gave squatters occupancy
rights and were enforceable against all parties except the Crown.” Id. at 16. These annual
squatting licenses were established in An Act to Restrain the Unauthorized Occupation of
Crown Land, 7 Wm. IV, No. 4, and the eviction rights retained by the Crown reflected the
BCO’s concern about “ceding Crown rights and potential revenue from later sale.” Id. All the
same, the squatters’ interests were protected by the license system against other private
parties; enforcement, including resolution of boundary disputes, was provided by the Crown
Lands Commissioners. Id.
38. See, e.g., id. at 16 (noting that despite the ability of the Crown to “evict squatters at
any time without compensation” on the Australian frontier under the BCO’s licensing system,
there remained “an active market for squatters’ runs”); see generally Michael Trebilcock &
Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2008).
39. Terminology varies, with the terms “small title,” “minor title,” and “petit title” ap-
pearing in the literature.
40. See Deng, supra note 31, at 2; see also Yun-chien Chang, Property Law with Chinese
Characteristics: An Economic and Comparative Analysis, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY
RIGHTS CONF. J. 345 (2012).
41. See, e.g., Deng, supra note 31, at 1 (describing eminent domain as “the only legal way
to convert rural land into urban land that is owned by the government”). In China, rural land
that is owned by local collectives cannot be legally alienated for urban development outside
of the eminent domain process. See id. at 2; see also Ruoying Chen, Divided World: China’s
Land Tenure System and Implication to Foreign Investment in China, DONG-A J. INT’L BUS.
TRANSACTION L. (Spring 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665175; Eva Pils, Waste
No Land, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 2, 18 (2010) (detailing the strict alienability restrictions
on rural land).
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so allows the parties to the transaction to capture the surplus as-
sociated with moving land from a low-valued use to a high-valued
use—surplus that would otherwise be captured by government
actors or developers. Whether because monitoring and enforcement
are imperfect, or because local collectives green-light the transac-
tions and provide some protective cover from adverse governmental
action, a significant amount of property is transferred in this way.42
These small title sales occur at a large discount (in Beijing, re-
portedly at about 25–30% of the price of a legitimate housing unit).43
The discount is presumably due to the greater risk or reduced market-
ability associated with the lack of a legally recognized title. Questions
might arise as to the purchaser’s rights against interloping private
parties, as well as against the government in the case of dispossession.
We would expect to see the price reduced by the expected costs of hold-
ing property that lacks legal approval, whether those costs come in
the form of legal sanctions, non-compensable losses inflicted by pub-
lic or private actors, or greater difficulty retransferring the property.44
The magnitude and composition of the expected costs associated
with small title are empirical questions that I must leave to others.
The generalizable point, however, is that parties will evaluate out-
lawed options based on their expected costs and benefits, which must
in turn be compared to the costs and benefits associated with the
available legal options.45 The following stylized example illustrates
some dimensions of the choice to transact outside the law.46
42. See Deng, supra note 31, at 1 (relating reports “that about 20% of all new housing
sales in Beijing in 2007" were small title housing units).
43. Id.
44. As Ruoying Chen has suggested, and as discussed below, difficulty in transferring may
actually be a strength from a policy perspective if it induces self-selection along normatively
desirable lines. Chen, supra note 31, at 31–36; see also infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
45. An analogy can be found in discussions of the opportunity costs of crime, which focus
on how much someone has to gain and lose from violating the law, relative to her current
position. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
23, 27–28.
46. This example dovetails in some respects with Tom Ginsburg’s “actuarial theory of
property rights protection.” Tom Ginsburg, The “China Problem” Reconsidered: Property
Rights and Economic Development in Northeast Asia 13–20 (2011) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). Under that theory, a risk of undercompensated expropriation does not
entirely negate the investment-inducing benefits of a property regime, if the risk is kept
within acceptable bounds by outside constraints, political or otherwise. My point in the
ensuing example and in the later discussion of property hydraulics is that both public and
private expropriation risks nonetheless form the backdrop against which other embedded real
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1. A Stylized Example
Suppose that there are 100 parcels in a particular rural commu-
nity, each worth 500 in its present use. Ten of the parcels will be
randomly selected to have its value to the owner diminished by one
half (thus, to 250) without compensation (whether through outright
appropriation with undercompensation or otherwise).47 The back-
ground expected loss per parcel, then, is 25, and the value of each
parcel given the risk of appropriation is 475.48 At present, all 100
parcels are legally restricted to a low-intensity residential use (one
small cottage per acre) but would be twice as valuable (that is, worth
1000 rather than 500) if developed for use at a higher density for
multifamily urban housing.
The present occupants are legally precluded from removing the
use restriction or transferring new use rights to someone else. But
suppose both moves are accomplished anyway, outside of the law.
Suppose further that the only negative consequence that will follow
is a risk of a completely uncompensated appropriation that will de-
stroy the value of the property to its owner. If the chance of appro-
priation remains at 10%, but compensation drops to zero (owing to
the lack of formal title held by the in-movers), then the property
now has an expected value, given the appropriation risk, of 900
(1000 minus 100). This is much better than 475. Of course, the risk
of appropriation might rise, whether because the government seeks
to deter future transfers of this sort or simply because the property
has become a more attractive target to a price-sensitive government.
property options are exercised, and against which decisions about activities will be made. In
my view, this analysis can also be applied to highly property-protective liberal democracies
like the United States; Ginsburg, in contrast, limits his actuarial theory to “developmental
states.” See id. at 16.
47. To keep the example simple, I assume a single-period interaction rather than a series
of periods to which we might apply a hazard rate. Because the alternatives being compared
all extend risks across time in a similar way, the simplification does not interfere with the
main point of the example. I also assume that the appropriation simply drops the value to one
half of what it presently is in its current use, setting aside the possibility that the appro-
priation of half the parcel would be coupled with other changes that would increase or reduce
the value of the remaining portion.
48. Each owner runs a 10% chance of losing 250 (half of 500), for an expected loss of 25.
When this expected loss is subtracted from the original value of 500, the resulting expected
value is 475.
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But even if the risk rises fivefold, the expected value of the trans-
formed land would still be 500 (1000 minus 500), in excess of the
starting value of 475.
With numbers like these, it is not hard to see both why such trans-
actions might happen, and why they would happen at a substantial
discount (as compared with a legally valid transfer). In this example,
the background risk of governmental option exercise plays only a
small role in the story; the sharp rise in value associated with urban
use seems to be doing most of the work. But such background risk
could well play a larger role than the expected value numbers alone
suggest, leading to a preference for outlawed transfers even when
the value increase from the land’s transformation is more modest.
This is particularly likely to the extent that risk-averse current res-
idents are able to enter into or influence informal transfers.49 For
such households, the ability to replace the specter of an uncertain
displacement with a certain departure would be very valuable.50
2. Remaining Puzzles
The simple example above is not meant to (and does not) capture
the empirically complex picture of small title in China. But it does
help to illustrate the impetus behind small title transactions. If the
gains from trade are large enough, they may swamp the disadvan-
tages associated with a transfer that lacks legal approval—especially
when considered against a backdrop in which undercompensated
appropriation risks already loom relatively large. Two questions re-
main, however. First, why are in-movers, who may also be risk averse,
willing to take their chances with small title? And second, why does
the government seem to tolerate small title transfers?
49. Small title sales have reportedly included both transfers by individual peasant house-
holds and sales by local village collectives. See Pils, supra note 41, at 41. The fact that local
collectives own the land complicates the decision-making picture even in the former case.
Where collectives transact over large blocks of rural land, the preferences of particular rural
households may or may not be taken into account by the village leadership. I thank Donald
Clarke for comments on this point.
50. See, e.g., Pils, supra note 41, at 40–41 (noting the advantages alienability would hold
for peasant households).
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Why Do In-Movers Chance It? If the effect of the housing trans-
action is to shift risk to the in-movers, and perhaps amplify it in
the process, shouldn’t the in-movers’ own risk aversion make such
transactions unattractive?
An initial question is whether risk is actually amplified or re-
duced by the transfer. One hypothesized repercussion of engaging
in unapproved transactions might be a heightened risk of government
appropriation, if the lack of legal title eliminates the government’s
obligation to compensate. But it is far from clear that this has been
the case. The government is likely to be sensitive not only to the le-
gality of holdings but also the identity of the holders, and the politi-
cal power that they have. Even if the in-movers are legally easier to
dispossess, they may be politically harder to dispossess than the rural
residents who were previously on the land.51 Moreover, the longer the
new residents remain in place, the more entrenched their expecta-
tions may become, and the higher the political strike price will rise
for the government to exercise its expropriation option. Another po-
tential disadvantage of small title might be a reduced ability to en-
force one’s property claims against private encroachment. Here too,
however, some indications point in the opposite direction.52
It is also possible that the urban in-movers are a self-selected
group that tend to have lower levels of risk aversion than other
would-be urban home buyers. Urban in-movers may also have access
to other advantages (relatively greater wealth, better access to urban
employment, or stronger claims on the social insurance system) that
make them systematically better able to bear risk than the rural
out-movers.53 Under these circumstances, the large discount in home
51. I thank Donald Clarke for discussions on this point.
52. Suggestive in this respect is the treatment of land disputes that have arisen between
villagers who sold their property through small-title transactions to artists in what is now the
Songzhuang art district in Beijing. LAIKWAN PANG, CREATIVITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OFFENSES 155 (2012). Because
land prices rose sharply after the sales, the villagers came to regret the bargains. In one
decided case, the villager Ma Haitao sued the artist Li Yulan four years after a small title
land transaction, seeking to have the deal struck for illegality. The court recognized that
the deal was illegal and invalidated the sale—but also held that Ma had to compensate Li
for the loss. Id.; see also Chen, supra note 31, at 5.
53. China’s Household Registration System (hukou) historically drew sharp distinctions
between rural and urban residents that kept rural migrants from securing the benefits of
urban dwellers. Although these barriers have been lowered considerably in recent decades,
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prices (compared with legally approved purchases) may prove suffi-
cient to compensate in-movers for the risk they bear. Put another
way, the gain from changing the use of the property is so great as
to swamp both the increased expected value of appropriation and
risk-averse reactions to it.54
Why Does the Government Tolerate It? When small title trans-
fers occur, the transacting parties glean surplus that could other-
wise go to the government.55 Why, then, are small title transactions
tolerated,56 given the ability of the government to adopt polices
(with respect to eminent domain, for example) that would diminish
their attractiveness?
Here, I can only speculate and ask for information from those who
know the situation better. As a matter of theory, three possibilities
are worth considering. An initial and relatively uninteresting one
would turn on enforcement costs. While some commentators report
that monitoring problems are considerable in some contexts,57 these
some distinctions remain. See BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND
GROWTH (2007); Chen, supra note 41, at 2–7.
54. The fact that surplus exists sufficient to cover the heightened risk does not, of course,
tell us whether the in-movers or the out-movers are the efficient risk-bearers. If the trans-
action costs are too high for leaving appropriation risk on the rural out-movers (as through
some form of warranty or seller insurance program) the in-movers might end up with the risk
even if they are not systematically better at bearing it.
55. The surplus from a rural to urban redesignation might flow to developers instead of
to the government, but the government’s role in directing that flow would presumably produce
valuable political capital. It is also possible that some of the surplus could be captured by
corrupt government officials.
56. The government’s stance toward small title transactions appears to be in flux as
of this writing, although the direction of movement is unclear. I have been advised of a re-
cent Chinese news report indicating the government will allow collectively owned land to be
leased (email communication from Donald Clarke, citing http://china.caixin.com/2012-01-08
/100346665.html). I have also been advised of a pronouncement in November 2011 by China’s
Ministry of Land and Resources that rural land registrations will be accelerated but small
title transactions will not be registered (email communication from Yun-chien Chang, citing
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/zytz/201111/t20111110_1024313.htm).
57. See Gregory M. Stein, Acquiring Land Use Rights in Today’s China: A Snapshot
from on the Ground, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 29 (2006) (noting reports of difficult en-
forcement, including that of “[o]ne professional” in China who stated “that the central
government has been taking satellite photos of agricultural areas on a regular basis and
examining them to confirm that cultivable land is being used for agricultural purposes
throughout the growing season and is not being used in other ways without the knowledge
of the central government”).
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transformations of rural land to urban residential use seem to be
relatively easy to spot.58 Moreover, following Gary Becker’s obser-
vations, more severe sanctions could compensate for a lower rate
of detection to achieve a desired level of enforcement.59 Yet, as Eva
Pils observes, enforcement to date has mostly been “half-hearted
and inefficient.”60
A more interesting possibility is a price discrimination story. The
government might be viewed as providing land use transformation
services when it acquires rural land through condemnation and con-
veys it anew as urban land. Urban developers and in-movers who de-
sire the benefits of such land use transformation may be unwilling
to pay the going rate. Small title transactions offer a cheaper mech-
anism of accomplishing the transformation. If the in-movers would
not have paid full price, the government may not have lost a reve-
nue stream.61 Governmental losses are controlled in any event by
the appropriation option that it maintains over these properties,
especially if compensation requirements are diluted by the lack of
formal title.
The market-thinning work that legal restrictions perform has
other implications as well. Ruoying Chen builds on the idea of self-
selection prompted by legal restrictions to argue for delinking for-
mal title in rural property from free alienability.62 The lack of legal
approval for informal small title transfers currently thins the market
by ruling out the risk averse and those bent on speculation. Formal-
izing title would carry clear advantages, but unless it is accompa-
nied by alienability restrictions that perform a similar function in
58. Pils, supra note 41, at 41 (“While the phenomenon of ‘minor property rights’ share
important features with black—or gray—markets, it is a market in a commodity that is
startlingly difficult to hide away, and that can only be thought to exist because it is to some
degree tolerated by officials.”).
59. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
184 (1968).
60. Pils, supra note 41, at 42; see also Chen, supra note 31, at 5 (noting the absence of
public reports of eviction of small title urban buyers, aside from two resettlement cases in
which urban buyers were relocated and received back the full original purchase price).
61. The price discrimination story works better if the central government gains some
revenue (or saves costs) as a result of these transfers. The local collectives play an important
role in informally ratifying the sales, and the repeat-play interactions between these local
governing bodies and the central government might afford opportunities for some of the
surplus from small title sales to flow to the latter.
62. Chen, supra note 31, at 31–36.
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restricting market participation, the character and pace of transfers
would be very different from what is observed now.63
A third possible explanation flows from the real options literature.
When parties exercise options in ways that are visible to others, those
exercises provide information.64 For example, if one owner drills an
oil well or develops a shopping area, nearby owners learn something
as a result.65 Thus, there may be instances in which a party would
not want to be the first mover in exercising a particular option. If
the government wants to observe and gather information from the
option exercises of others, it cannot simultaneously maintain a com-
plete monopoly on exercising options of that sort. A compromise po-
sition would be a formal monopoly with some degree of tolerance for
informal option exercises on the ground. Seeing where development
is taken up and where it succeeds in attracting buyers (even within
the somewhat constrained setting of small property rights) yields
useful information.
III. LESSONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY
The discussion to this point has focused primarily on describing
and analyzing how ERPOs work—both inside and outside legal
parameters. In this last Part, I want to offer some brief thoughts on
the lessons that an appreciation of ERPOs can hold for social policy.
A. Get Beyond Ownership
The first and clearest takeaway point is for social planners to
recognize the ERPOs that already exist, and to understand the ways
in which they interact with legal rules and governmental policies.
Because these options are embedded rather than explicit, it can be
easy to miss their significance and to fall back on legal categories
like “ownership” that are ultimately less helpful.66 Whether or not
63. Id. at 35–36.
64. Steven R. Grenadier, Information Revelation Through Option Exercise, in GAME
CHOICES: THE INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY 125 (Steven Grenadier
ed., 2000).
65. Id. at 126–27.
66. See Donald Clarke, China’s Stealth Urban Land Revolution 1 (June 2011) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that “[t]he concept of ownership . . .
ultimately proves useless as an analytical tool”).
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the law deems an occupier to be an “owner” may tell us little or noth-
ing about what set of options the person holds—she may be desig-
nated as a non-owner but yet have a robust set of valuable options,
or be considered an owner but have a tightly curtailed set of options.
Moreover, informal arrangements and de facto rights, along with tol-
erated forms of illegality, can make property rights look quite different
on the ground than they might appear in formal legal descriptions.
Translating de jure and de facto entitlements into the common
currency of ERPOs is particularly important when cross-country
comparisons are involved. For example, inordinate emphasis is often
placed on the fact that entitlement-holders in China do not actually
own the land they occupy but rather only own rights in the land.67
But rights in land are all that anyone can really own, whatever la-
bels we may apply to the legal relationship.68 Indeed, in the U.S.,
the lofty title of “owner” often corresponds to highly restricted sets
of options.69
This is not to deny the power of labels. Surely it is significant as
a matter of ideology and politics that one society calls holders of en-
titlements landowners and another does not. Moreover, the cultural
meaning associated with particular ways of describing property en-
titlements can shape the social and political reality in very impor-
tant ways.70 Yet unless policymakers can get behind the labels to see
what a system of entitlements actually lets a given party do (both
inside and outside the prescribed legal parameters), they cannot
fine-tune the contents of the package or even assess the implications
of one label or another.
B. Heed Hydraulics
A second takeaway lesson suggested by a focus on ERPOs relates
to what we might call the hydraulic nature of property rights: pres-
sures along one margin can produce responses along other dimen-
sions.71 Suppose that, through some combination of legal restrictions
67. See generally id.
68. See id. at 2.
69. See, e.g., id. at 4.
70. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 449 (2010).
71. The hydraulic metaphor has been used in many legal contexts. See, e.g., Peter K.
Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005)
2012] OPTIONS FOR OWNERS AND OUTLAWS 259
and market interactions, people end up with entitlements that are
not well suited to their needs. These kinds of mistakes fall under
the general head of misassigned entitlements. If transaction costs
are zero, the mistake does not matter, but where transaction costs
(or other barriers) are significant, the mistake can stick.72 In between
the frictionless plane of zero transaction costs and the deep mire of
locked-in suboptimality lies a range of possibilities that can be col-
lectively understood as hydraulic in nature.
Adaptations can reduce the costs associated with suboptimal prop-
erty interests, but at a price. Like any hydraulic system, property can
be expected to adapt in the way that offers the least resistance (that
is, where the largest marginal gains can be achieved per unit of cost).
Sometimes transactions outside of the law’s approved structure will
be the cheapest path, while at other times a limitation or removal of
one embedded option will prompt the exercise of a different option.73
Significantly, adaptation does not always involve changes in prop-
erty uses alone; people’s behavior may change as well, if this rep-
resents the cheaper path. Thus, property rights (or the lack thereof)
can change the way that people live and work.
Consider, for example, settings where formal property rights are
not available and squatters maintain their claims by continually
physically possessing the land.74 A thicker form of property rights
might be better suited to the set of activities that the household
would prefer, such as pursuing employment and social opportuni-
ties away from the home. Without a ready way to thicken those
rights unilaterally, however, the response may be to adapt behav-
iors by moving employment and socialization to the home, or by
(“To some extent, the intellectual property system functions like a hydraulic system; a change
in the system may be offset by an identical change in the opposite direction.”); Geoffrey A.
Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 473 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring:
Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 721–24 (2011)
(discussing “the hydraulics of [doctrinal] borrowing and convergence”).
72. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
73. In this respect, regulation can operate like a tax that alters the relative attractiveness
of the available options. The taxation analogy has been made explicit in the literature on
inclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of ‘Inclusionary’ Zoning, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1981) (describing most inclusionary zoning programs as “essentially
taxes on the production of new housing”).
74. Put into an options framework, the lack of formal title raises the exercise price of the
option to remain by requiring that it be perpetually paid in kind through actual possession.
260 PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL [Vol. 1:239
otherwise pursuing activities that are complements to staying at
home.75 In other words, a form of functional bundling—using the
home for more purposes than just residential—operates as a re-
sponse to thinness in formal rights.
The fact that behavior changes in response to a property system
does not necessarily carry negative normative implications. Like a
Pigouvian tax that is designed to internalize externalities, a prop-
erty system can quite consciously and rationally put pressure on
certain behavioral choices and ease the path for others. Indeed,
property systems as a whole can be understood as mechanisms for
channeling behavior along certain lines, such as investment and
trade, rather than others, such as shirking and fighting.76 The diffi-
culty is in identifying when a property system’s design is inducing
needless behavioral distortions, and when the design is actually cor-
recting a distortion of some kind.
To return to the example above, it is possible that very thin pos-
sessory rights that induce functional bundling of residency, work,
and socialization could produce important positive spillovers within
a given social context. On the other hand, we can easily imagine in-
stances where this same bundling would produce large deadweight
losses. Tracing the likely adaptive responses offers policymakers
opportunities to avoid unintended consequences and channel be-
havior in desired directions. It also underscores a fact that may go
underappreciated—that property as experienced on the ground is
the result of an iterative process involving not only law and markets
but also the choices of owners and other possessors.
75. See Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Property Rights and Economic Develop-
ment, in 5 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 4525, 4531–32 (Dani Rodrik & Mark
Rosenzweig, eds., 2010) (noting the possibility of such complementarity, as where constant
presence on agricultural property by a farmer can simultaneously serve purposes of guarding
the property and maximizing its productivity). A more skeptical view is suggested in SPENCER
HEATH MACCALLUM, THE ART OF COMMUNITY 77 (1970) (noting the losses in productivity for
one who “must rest one hand always on the sword, leaving but one for the tiller or the plow”);
see also Field, supra note 22 (finding differences between titled and untitled squatter commu-
nities in Peru with respect to household members remaining at home during the day).
76. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk
Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 131 (1998) (explaining that
“property allows owners to trade with one another, rather than getting into unproductive
and wasteful fights over resources”); Besley & Ghatak, supra note 75 (reviewing empirical
and theoretical literature and developing an analytic framework for assessing how property
rights affect economic development).
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C. Learn from Option Exercises
Responses to legal constraints, including the use of outlawed
options, can create challenges for legal policy. But, along with other
observed option exercises, they can also offer opportunities for
learning. An anecdote from Jane Jacobs about sidewalk placement
provides a useful analogy:
Back in the 1950s when plans started to appear for one-story,
spread-out high schools instead of three or four storied tradi-
tional buildings, architects for one of these first new schools—in
Connecticut if I remember correctly—weren’t sure where to lo-
cate walks for students and staff criss-crossing outdoor grounds
between classrooms and other facilities like gyms, auditoriums,
and cafeterias. Should they rely on guesswork? Or depend on
neat geometric schemes? Should perhaps everything be paved?
The architects let the problem stand unsolved until the school
had been in use throughout its first winter, during which they
mapped the paths which users had made in the snow. The archi-
tects let users inform them where paths should go.77
The idea that social planners can learn something from those who
blaze new paths or deviate from the ones that society has laid down
is an intriguing one. Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal have ex-
plored the potentially valuable role of “outlaws” who break property
rules.78 Although, as the authors acknowledge, lawbreakers can in-
flict high social costs, there may be some silver linings associated
with their behavior. Perhaps the most important of these is the in-
formational signal produced by a violation or pattern of violations—
which is all the stronger for being a violation, and hence something
the violator is willing to risk punishment for.79 Interpreting and
77. Jane Jacobs, Random Comments, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 537, 539 (2001); see also
CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER ET AL., A PATTERN LANGUAGE 586 (1977) (“The layout of paths will
seem right and comfortable only when it is compatible with the process of walking. And the
process of walking is far more subtle than one might imagine.”).
78. See EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2009); Eduardo
Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007).
79. See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 78, at 169–82; Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 78,
at 1137–38, 1181; Lee Anne Fennell, Order with Outlaws?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
269 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Fennell.pdf (response to Eduardo
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responding to these signals requires a clear understanding of the
outlawed options embedded in the possession and use of property
and their relationship to other legally approved ERPOs.
CONCLUSION
In this brief essay, I have only introduced in a general way the
considerations that follow from understanding property entitle-
ments as packages of embedded real property options. An option-
based understanding of property can offer useful guidance to those
who are charged with pursuing workable adjustments in legal rules
and social policy. Such an approach can also facilitate comparative
work, by providing an analytic framework that emphasizes func-
tional commonalities and resists labels and rigid categories. While
others are better equipped than I to speak to the on-the-ground
situation of small title transactions in China, I hope to have shown
how options analysis offers a useful tool for examining this property
puzzle and many others.
Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007)); Lee
Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1037, 1073–75 (2006).
